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FAMILY LAW 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER 
INTRODUCTION 
• 
This year, the legislature passed a divorce refonn bill. By comparison, 
all other events in the field of family law were trivial. 
In litigation, the issues were not revolutionary. Parents fought over 
the light to child custody. 1Iothers brought actions to identify fathers of 
their dlildren and trial courts rushed to their defense despite, in some cases, 
marriage to other persons at the time of conception. One court was willing 
to believe respondent to be a father, despite medical testimony of his 
sterility; when he allowed surgical exploration after the trial which demon­
su"ated Ills sterility, the court ruled the offer untimely. Another court found 
itself ready to accept the mother's contested version of events despite the 
fact that it was premised on a statistically most improbable period of 
gestation. Appellate courts were somewhat more moderate: the first case 
was reversed on appeal; the second was afed by a closely divided court. 
A transsexual was denied a change in birth certificate to indicate the opted 
female role. Mostly, though, the litigation concerned money. 
HUSBAND AND "\VIFE 
Marriage.-One of the weapons in the arsenal of the uncompromising 
one-ground divorce law is the statutory prohibition against remarriage by 
the guilty party in a divorce action.1 Designed presumably to prevent the 
maniage of the adulterer and Ills lover and thus reduce the temptation to 
commit adultery, the device had become obsolete as a result of the recogni­
tion of out-of-state marriages by divorce defendants and easy modification 
of l"emarriage proIllbitions.2 Nonetheless, the barb in the statute occasionally 
impaled the unwal),. 
Fannie Farber found her fonnal New York marriage invalidated for 
failure to obtain a timely modification of the divorce decree proIllbiting her 
to remarry,3 and thus was denied death benefits under workmen's com­
pensation upon the decease of her "husband." Fortunately, resourceful 
counsel has found an avenue of compensation for Mrs. Farber who will now 
collect workmen's compensation, not on the basis of her invalid fonnal 
New York marriage, but on the basis of a somewhat later cohabitation in 
George J. Alexander is Associate Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College 
of Law and a Member of the New York and lllinois Bars. 
I. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 8. 
2. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333-34. 
3. Farber v. United States Trucking Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 740, 247 N.Y.S.2d 82 (3d 
Dep't 1964); Alexander, Family Law, 1964 Survey of N.Y. Law, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 402, 
405 nn.21-22 and accompanying text. 
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Florida.4 Since Florida recognizes common-law marriage, the court found 
the Farbers to be married in Florida. The court was not concerned that the 
Farbers probably did not exchange marital vows in Florida, although such 
an exchange is recognized as a prerequisite to a valid common-law marriage . 
Since the parties assumed themselves validly married in New York they 
had no occasion to perceive the need for the renewed exchange of present 
vows. Thus, once again, the injunctive provision of section 8 was defeated. 
With the effective date of the divorce reform bill , September 1, 1967, such 
rescue efforts will no longer be required. The provision has been repealed.1i 
Marital Dissolution.-As has so often been true in the past, the most 
important new events in matrimonial law this year concerned dissolving 
marriages. After a heated legislative debate and some compromise, a new 
divorce bill was passed ending the comi-tragic history of single ground 
divorce in New York State.6 The most important feature of the new biIF is 
newly written Section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law which recognizes 
five grounds for divorce: (1) cruelty, (2) abandonmen t for two or more years, 
(3) imprisonment for three or more years, (4) adultery (a broadened defini­
tion to include sodomy), and finally, (5) two years of living apart under a 
decree of separation or a filed separation agreement. 
In conjunction with the new divorce grounds, the legislature has 
provided for ma ndatory conciliation for a period not to exceed 120 days 
from the service of summons . In essence, during that period, largely in the 
discretion of a "Conciliation Commissioner" (who is to be an attorney 
admitted to practice in New York for at least five years), the parties may 
be required to attend conciliation conferences with counselors. The Com­
missioner may call a halt to conciliation proceedings at any time by issuing 
a certificate of no necessity or no further nece ssity.8 
A third major feature of the new law is Section 250 of the Domestic 
Relations Law.9 That section purports to create a presumption of New 
York domicile on the part of a person obtaining an out-of-state divorce if 
either he was domiciled in New York within a year before the divorce and 
resumed residence within the s tate during eighteen months afterward , or 
continued to maintain a residence in New York in the interval between 
his departure and return to the state. The section is taken from the Uniform 
Recognition of Divorce Act. It  appears on its face to apply equally to 
divorces granted by courts having in personam jurisdiction of one or both 
parties. In the latter application, i t  would appear to offend full faith and 
4. Farber v. United States Trucking Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 1047, 265 N.Y.S.2d 324 (3d 
Dep't 1965). 
5. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 1. 
6. See generally Blake, Road to Reno (1962). 
7. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 2. 
8. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 215-c (b)(2) 8: (4) (McKinney Supp. 1966) (effective Sept. I ,  
1967). 
9. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 250 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (effective Sept. I, 1967) • 
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credit provlSlons of the federal constitution assuming that the divorce­
granting state would not allow comparable attack of New York decrees in 
their own courts.10 In any application, the new provision would appear to 
test again the extent to which a state may, constitutionally, protect its 
interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries against the "quickie" 
divorce decrees of sister states,11 
In the case of bilateral divorces, the state can avoid the constitutional 
question by reliance on the doctrine of estoppel. A precedent in this state 
would appear strongly to support the estoppel of a person who has appeared 
in a foreign court, either to bring or to defend a divorce action in that 
court'!:: Nothing in the new bill prevents the application of the doctrine 
to bar the suit of one of the parties to a bilateral foreign decree. 
The provision also does not speak to the question of the validity of a 
sister state decree based on residence rather than domicile. Presumably, a 
finding, prima facie, of no domicile-the only result prescribed in Section 
250 of the Domestic Relations Law-would not establish an insufficient 
basis for such a foreign decree. Mexican decrees of the kind just recently 
upheld in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,13 are based on residence at best. Again 
it is difficult to see how the provision that establishes, prima facie, domicile, 
speaks to the validity of such divorces. On the other hand, it would be even 
more difficult to understand a provision of this sort if it undermined foreign 
decrees from sister states which are constitutionally entitled to respect, and 
left unscathed Mexican decrees, clearly not entitled to the same protection. 
Section 250 would not seem to be suited to easy application. Divisible 
divorce has, however, always spawned confusion.14 The new provisions will 
merely add another chapter. 
One of the most curious changes made by the new law is accomplished 
by legislative inaction. It is quite uncertain, under the provisions to become 
effective in 1967, what, if any, defenses apply to actions for divorce. The 
title of the statute purports to repeal Section 171 of the New York Domestic 
Relations Law containing the defenses to a divorce action, but the bill 
accomplishes no such result. The original divorce bill,15 provided a sub­
stitute section 171, broad enough to include of the divorce grounds, but it 
was not passed. The result, apparently, is that present Domestic Relations 
Law Section 171 will remain applicable unless further legislative change 
10. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). 
11. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (protection of economic interests); 
Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (re-examination of jurisdictional basis 
for altering status). 
12. Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 306, 70 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1st Dep't 1947), aII'd, 297 
N.Y. 800, 78 N.E.2d 20 (1948); Boxer v. Boxer, 12 Misc. 2d 205, 177 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup. Ct., 
 Co. 1958), alI'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 1001, 184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't), alI'd, 7 N.Y.2d 
 163 N.E.2d 149, 194 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1959). 
13. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965). 
14. See notes 23-29 infra and accompanying text. 
15. S. Int. No. 627, Pro No. 627; A. Int. No. 1327, Pro No. 1327 (1966). 
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is forthcoming. Section 171 provides for the defenses of procurement, con­
nivance, condonation, recrimination, and a five-year statute of limitations. 
The introductory clause to the section, however, prohibits a divorce "al­
though the adultery is established" in the cases mentioned. It remains 
unclear whether the defenses apply in cases not premised on adutlery. 
The new divorce law also amends Section !J-3l l of the General Obliga­
tions Law. The changes in this section became effective immediately upon 
the passage of the bill. Its most important feature would appear to be the 
fact that it overrules the effect of Viles v. Viles.1s It is broadly 'written, 
however,) and one must wonder whether it has other applications as well. 
Does the language of the section, which defines a contract to alter or dis­
solve marriage as one containing as express provision for dissolution of the 
marriage, or the procurement of grounds for divorce, also effect the making 
of separation agreements? It is presently true that a separation agreement 
is valid only when made by parties living apart.l7 Otherwise it is to be 
treated as an agreement to alter the marriage.1S Since such an agreement 
need not contain an express provision requiring dissolution of the marriage 
or procurement of grounds for divorce, the statute would appear to allow 
separation agreements prior to actual separation and, indeed, appear to 
allow married couples to contract for a future separation although not for 
a future divorce. More farfetched is the inquiry whether one can now 
provide for the dissolution of marriage as a condition precedent to increased 
payments under a separation agreement merely by describing the prereq­
uisite dissolution differently. For example, could one now make a separation 
agreement providing that the economic benefits under the contract will 
cease in the event that a defense is interposed to an action brought for 
divorce in a sister state? Such a provision would not seem an "express 
provision requiring the dissolution of the marriage" but would seem to 
have the same effect. 
The new law also ends the prohibition against remarriage running 
against a defendant in a divorce action.19 It alters separation grounds20 and 
provides uniform sections relating to statutes of limitations, pleadings and 
proof, and residence requirements,2l and accomplishes other minor changes.22 
Foreign divorces for New York residents raised their usual number of 
problems during this year. The concept of estoppel has been used in this 
16. 36 Misc. 2d 731, 233 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 
2d 626 245 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1st Dep't 1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 200 N.E.2d 567, 251 N.Y.S.2d 
672 (1964); see text accompanying note 98 infra for a discussion of the Viles case. 
17. Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939). 
18. Ibid. 
19. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text. 
20. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (effective Sept. 1, 1967). 
21. N.Y. Dom. Rei. Law §§ 210, 211, 230 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (effective Sept. 1, 
1967). 
22. For an excellent summary and analysis see Foster & Freed, The Divorce Reform 
Law (1966). 
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state with some frequency to bar relitigation by an appearing party to a 
foreign divorce.23 Is the doctrine applicable to a second husband who, 
although not appearing in the foreign jurisdiction, had participated in the 
arrangements for his wife's divorce from her former husband? In the wake 
of Rosenstiel v. Rosenstielp· courts differed.25 
A nonappearing party, absent reasons for estoppel. is of course not 
estopped. However, suppose that, even in that case, the testimony to prove 
a fraudulent claim of domicile would have to come from an appearing wife. 
One would find it easy to agree with the first department: "The facts per­
taining to respondent's residence in Alabama are particularly within her 
knowledge and it is appropriate that her deposition regarding them be 
taken."26 Could one argue that such appearing spouse should be estopped 
to deny her assertion of foreign domicile? Perhaps the effect of the decision 
in Wasserman v. Wasserman27 is to grant such an estoppel without denom­
inating it as such. The reasoning appears to be as follows: Plaintiff-husband, 
a stranger to the foreign decree, is not estopped. However, his wife, his 
only witness, by her prior inconsistent claim of foreign domicile, has made 
herself a witness unworthy of belief. Since the presumption of validity 
extended foreign decrees by virtue of the full faith and credit clause cannot 
be met by the wife's testimony standing alone, she has, in effect, been 
"estopped" from denying the foreign domicile. 
One of the difficulties with the application of the Wasserman principle 
arises from the fact that the state's interest in preserving marriage may 
well explain either result. In an effort to protect a former spouse, the state 
may have an interest in allowing a foreign divorce to be attacked in state 
courts. On the other hand, if the other spouse has remarried, as is frequently 
the case, it is possible to discuss estoppel in terms of the state's interest in 
preserving the later marriage. "Finally, a contrary determination here 
[allowing collateral attack] would violate the strong public policy of this 
State which favors the continuity of marriage."28 
Another bizzarre question arising out of the full faith and credit 
controversy concerns the problem of a sister state divorce decree which has 
been set aside in the sister state. To which decree must New York give full 
faith and credit? Is it the initial decree granting the divorce or the later one 
declaring the first to be void? Since the second decree had been obtained on 
the wife's application without notice to the husband, both the trial court 
23. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
24. Supra note 13. 
25. Yenoff v. Yenoff, 50 Misc. 2d 798, 271 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1966) (not 
estopped); Parrish v. Parrish, 50 Misc. 2d 827, 271 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1966) 
(estopped). 
26. Goodman v. Goodman, 25 App. Div. 2d 646·47, 268 N.Y.S.2d 545·46 (1st Dep't 
1966). 
27. Wasserman v. Wasserman, 49 Misc. 2d 577, 268 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct., Oneida Co. 
1966). 
28. Id. at 579-80, 268 N.Y.s.2d at 203. 
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and the appellate division thought it appropriate to give full faith and 
credit only to the first decree.29 However, the Court of Appeals disagreed 
and granted recognition to the second decree which declared the divorce 
void.30 
The reasoning of the appellate division, on which the Court of Appeals 
based its reversal, pointed out that it was perfectly proper for a party win­
ning a default judgment himself to vacate that judgment without notice to 
the defaulting party. While that might be perfectly sensible with respect 
to most default judgments, on the assumption that it is the plaintiff rather 
than the defendant who benefits from the judgment, divorce decrees, in 
fact, give both plaintiff and defendant rights: their rights to remarry. Can 
it be true that a husband's right to remarry based on his wife's divorce 
decree can be wiped out at the wife's pleasure in a proceeding of which he is 
given no notice?31 
A selection of other full faith and credit curios are noted in the foot­
notes.32 
CHILDREN 
Child Custody.-Highlighted in this year's cases is the pitiful plight 
of the mistreated child. In an effort to find a way of protecting the child, 
consistent with leaving him in a setting in which he can obtain a role as a 
member of the family, courts have become quite inventive. The suggestions 
made by Family Court judges this year commend themselves to legislative 
study. For example, in Godinez v. Russo,33 the court awarded custody of an 
illegitimate child to the putative father. In the process of articulating its 
finding of fact as to why the father would be a better custodian than the 
mother, the court suggested that the standard of custody for illegitimate 
children might more appropriately be the standard of Section 70 of the 
Domestic Relations Law which deals with the custody of legitimate children. 
29. John v. John, 22 App. Div. 2d 804, 254 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.). 
30. John v. John, 16 N.Y.2d 675, 209 N.E.2d 289, 261 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1965) (mem.). 
31. Cf. Herzog v. Herzog, 46 Misc. 2d 362, 259 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 
1965) (defeated husband entitled to a divorce decree when successful wife refused to 
enter it). 
32. In Sacks v. Sacks, 47 Misc. 2d 1050, 263 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965), 
it was held that N.Y. CPLR § 314(1), cannot constitutionally be applied to allow a 
declaration of nullity of a second marriage, following an allegedly invalid divorce, with­
out in personam jurisdiction over both marital partners to the second marriage, although 
an action to declare the nullity of the Mexican divorce would lie. In Schoenbrod v. Siegler, 
50 Misc. 2d 202, 270 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966), it was held that a husband who 
had obtained a Mexican divorce could obtain a decree in New York nullifying the 
Mexican decree by demonstrating that the divorced wife had never legally married him. 
Comity does not require accepting Mexican court's statement as to the validity of the 
marriage it purportedly dissolved. In Rocker v. Celebrezze, 358 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), 
H was divorced from W in Nevada; the Nevada divorce was declared invalid in New 
York where W was domiciled. For purposes of W's social security benefits, H, apparently 
domiciled in Nevada, was held not to be her husband since Nevada was entitled to prefer 
their own decrees over New York decrees. 
33. 49 Mise. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Family Ct., Westch. Co. 1966). 
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Specifically, Judge Slifkin suggested an abolition of the mother's presump­
tive right to custody in these cases. 
In another case Judge Polier, in the course of a scholarly exposition of 
the history of New York's battered child legislation, suggested many changes 
in such legislation.34 In the interim before new legislation is forthcoming 
some popularity seems to have been achieved for shifting to the approach 
which puts the burden of proof on the parent of an apparently battered 
child.35 In addition to the difficulty of obtaining proof of neglect, is the 
difficulty of enforcing better care for the child in the future. One answer 
may be to find a new custodian. In Godinez v. Russo,36 the court thought 
the putative father might be a better custodian. In Matter of Frances,37 
Judge Polier thought the maternal grandmother would do a better job and 
ordered custody changed to her. 
Even when the decision is made to leave the custody of the child 
undisturbed some method of providing access to the child by the court, 
should it be required, seems needed. Two approaches to that end were 
suggested this year. In State v. Dinin,38 a court upheld the family court's 
right, under Section 251 of the New York Family Court Act, to conduct a 
medical examination of a neglected child, who was eight years old, when it 
appeared necessary in order to assure the "\Velfare Department's surveillance 
of the treatment the child was receiving. In Anonymous v. Anonymous,39 
the court granted visitation rights to a paternal grandmother who had 
apparently appointed herself a watchdog of the grandchildren'S interest, 
cautioning the grandmother not to interfere in any way with the relation-
ship between the children and their mother. 
. 
On the other end of the child custody spectrum lie the unfortunates 
whose custody has become the subject of a judicial fight between their 
parents. Unguided by the sterile provision that the court's decree award 
custody "as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the 
circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the best 
interests of the child,"4o courts continue to grope for an easier way to make 
the difficult custody decision. This year, as in the past, trial courts had to 
be reminded to obtain al the professional help possible in making the 
decision and not to foreclose a hearing to the interested parties.41 One 
appellate court suggested: 
'Ve are also of the opinion that the court should consider utilizing the service of 
some appropriate person such as a family counsellor whose report might lead to 
84. Matter of Frances, 49 Misc. 2d 872, 267 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966). 
85. Matter of Young, 50 Misc. 2d 271, 270 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Family Ct., Westch. Co. 
1966); Matter of S, 46 Mise. 2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct., Kings Co. 1965). 
36. Supra note 33. 
37. Supra note 34. 
38. 49 Misc. 2d 585, 267 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1966). 
39. 50 Misc. 2d 43, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Family Ct., Queens Co. 1966). 
40. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 240. 
41. Sidari v. Siclari, 25 App. Div. 2d 677, 268 N.Y.S.2d 552 (2d Dep't 1966) (mem.). 
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the introduction of common-law evidence and appropriate questions by the court 
-in the event the parties refuse to stipulate that such report be considered as one 
of the bases for decision. . • • This procedure seems required by the patent dis­
advantages of attempting to determine from the simple testimonial record before 
the Referee [questions concerning the interaction of the parti,es].42 
One of the important reasons for disallowing custody determinations 
based on off-the-record information, received without the parties' consent,43 
has been the court's concern that no relevant information be overlooked. 
Another interest, not so often articulated, is the concern for due process 
in the litigation itself. Surely, however, there must be a limit to inquiry 
even if the goal of the court is to make an appropriate decision concerning 
child custody. A case this year suggests a need for greater limitation. In 
Johnson v. Johnson44 the court admitted testimony of the husband con­
cerning his wife's adultery. Admitting that the testimony would be incom­
petent with respect to the divorce,45 the court held it admissible nonetheless 
on the question of custody. Furthermore, the court permitted the wife's 
physician, at the husband's request, to testify and found his disclosure to 
fall within the exceptions to the physician-patient privilege. More disturbing 
was the dictum: 
In any event, we would not reverse even if the testimony concerning defendant's 
physical condition were inadmissible. That testimony was received on the ques· 
tion of custody of the children and was given little weight by the trial court in 
reaching the conclusion that custOdy should be given to the husband.46 
What of the child for whom no one is willing to assume a parental 
role? According to Judge Polier in Matter of Bonez,47 quite a few of them 
remain in the permanent limbo of foster care by a succession of foster 
families "and become just one more agency child without a family."48 Dis­
approving continued foster placement in this case, Judge Polier criticized 
the adoptive placement program of the Department of Welfare: 
The conclusion seems inescapable that the Department of Welfare, which has 
largely delegated its responsibility for the care of dependent and neglected children 
to voluntary agencies, is providing only infinitesimal adoptive services for Protes­
tant Negro children.49 
She then ordered the Probation Service to make referrals for adoptive place­
ments directly to all adoption agencies in the area and to report back to the 
court. 
42. Id. at 677, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 553. See also Matter of Dulay, 24 App. Div. 2d 208, 265 
N.Y.S.2d 247 (4th Dep't 1965): "[The] errors require a reversal and a new hearing at 
which the court should hear fully all persons who can assist him in arriving at a proper 
determination as to what is best for the welfare of this infant • • . .  " Id. at 211, 265 N.Y.S.2d 
at 250. 
43. See generally Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 333, 342. 
44. 25 App. Div. 2d 672, 268 N.Y.S.2d 403 (2d Dep't 1966). 
45. N.Y. CPLR § 4502(a). 
46. Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 44, at 673, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 406. 
47. 48 Misc. 2d 900, 266 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966). 
48. Id. at 904, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 760. 
49. Id. at 906, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 761. 
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A number of other shocking criticisms were aired in Judge Polier's de­
cision. When the cqurt requested help with adoptive placement of the 
children from voluntary agencies and the Department of Welfare, "the De­
partment notified the court that it did not accept Catholic or Jewish families, 
and that its direct adoption services were 'set up to implement private 
\'oluntary agencies to assist with Protestant Negro children.' "50 Further­
more, the court noted that the Department of "Welfare required that a 
specific home be available for a child before a surrender of the child would 
be accepted by the Department and that the Department has now imposed 
an additional condition to accepting surrender: The court must commit the 
<-hild to the Department of 'Welfare, thus surrendering jurisdiction over the 
<-hild to the Department. Judge Polier concluded that such restrictive re­
quirements were inconsistent with the requirements of Section 398(6)(f) of 
the Social 'Welfare Law, where the only consideration for the acceptance of 
�urrender by the Department is the welfare of the child. 
Adoption.-When the Family Court Act was passed, section 115-v pur­
ported to give the family court exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption 
proceedings, though section 641 gave the surrogate's court concurrent juris­
diction until September 1, 1 964. By 1964 enough resistance to exclusive 
jurisdiction in the family court had been mounted to obtain an amendment 
to section 1 15 striking from it the exclusive original jurisdiction for adop­
tion proceedings51 and postponing the date of exclusive jurisdiction until 
September of 1965. In 1965 the date was advanced to 1966,52 and in 1966 to 
to 1967.53 No clear end to the temporizing is in sight. Since the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the family court is based on a state constitutional provision,04 
some question as to the constitutionality of the continued concurrent juris­
diction has been raised. This year provided a test case-Adoption of Ek­
strom.u5 Surrogate McCall held that his court had adoption jurisdiction and 
that the statutory provision did not violate the New York State Constitution. 
''\Then the legislature last amended Section 1 1 7  of the Domestic Rela­
tions Law it provided that, on an order of adoption, the natural parents of 
tile foster child shall be relieved of parental duties and divested of rights 
in the child's property. The legislature also provided that the foster child 
shall not inherit from or through his natural parents. So strongly did the 
legislature feel about the termination of the former parental relationship 
that they made the provision applicable to "wills and inter vivos instruments 
then in effect so long as they were still subject to the grantor's power to 
50. Id. at 902 .. 03, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 758. 
51. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 383, § 2. 
52. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 339, § 1. 
53. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 641 (McKinney Supp. 1966). 
54. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 13(b). "The family court shall have jurisdiction over the 
following classes of actions and proceedings which shall be originated in such family court 
in the manner provided by law: • . •  (3) The adoption of persons . . • ." 
55. 49 Mise. 2d 224, 266 N.Y.s.2d 1008 (SUIT. Ct., Albany Co. 1966). 
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revoke or amend. This year they apparently decided that they had gone too 
far. The new provision, section 117(2), only curtails intestate descent and 
distribution between the child and his natural parents and provides further­
more that, with respect to wills and inter vivos instruments, the provisions 
shall 
not affect the right of any child to distribution of property under the will of his 
natural parents or their natural or adopted kindred whether such natural parent 
or kindred shall have died heretofore or shall die hereafter or under any inter 
vivos instrument heretofore or hereafter executed by such natural parent or his 
or her kindred.56 
For instruments that became final or irrevocable between March I, 1964 and 
March 8, 1966 (the effective date of this statute) the old law provided for 
inheritance by the adopted child and the new law purports to provide 
against such inheritance. One would think that a spate of litigation would 
follow. 
Paternity.-A paternity question much in doubt with the passage of 
the Family Court Act, whether a married woman might initiate a paternity 
action against a putative father not her husband,57 appears now to be rather 
well settled. The answer is a qualified yes. While Matter of Estate of 
Findlay,58 is still conceived to be a correct statement concerning the pre­
sumption of legitimacy for a child born to a married mother, Judge 
Cardozo's additional comment in Findlay,59 that legitimacy will be pre­
sumed even though the wife harbored an adulterer seems no longer correct. 
Now, apparently, a husband who has had intercourse with his wife almost 
to the time of conception and even one who has continued to cohabit with­
out intercourse beyond that time may be found not to be the father in favor 
of a finding against a third party.60 In addition a father who has had inter­
course during the time of conception may be excluded if he can offer blood 
tests precluding his paternity.61 
The liberality with which the presumption of paternity has been ig­
nored seems premised on the reasoning of Commissioner of Public Welfare 
v. Koehler,62 where it was held that an adjudication of paternity against a 
putative father is not equivalent to a finding of illegitimacy of the child. 
Indeed, if it becomes clear in a paternity proceeding that the holding of 
the court will affect the legitimacy of the child, the court will view the 
matter entirely differently. The child will then become a necessary party 
entitled to representation in the proceedings.63 Presumably, the presumption 
of legitimacy would be applied much more stringently. 
56. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 117(2) (McKinney Supp. 1966). 
57. See Alexander, Family Law, 1964 Survey of New York Law, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 
402, 414. 
58. 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930). 
59. Id. at 8, 170 N.E. at 473. 
60. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 25 App. Div. 2d 350, 269 N.Y.S.2d 653 (2d Dep't 1966). 
61. Oliver v. England, 48 Misc. 2d 335, 264 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Family Ct., Monroe Co. 
1965). 
62. 284 N.Y. 260, 30 N.E.2d 587  
63. Roe v. Roe, 49· Mise. 2d 1070,  N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966). 
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While the dichotomy between proceedings merely seeking support from 
the putative father and those which would have the effect of determining 
the illegitimacy of the child in a more permanent fashion may make good 
sense to lawyers and others sophisticated in law, one must wonder whether, 
in the lay community, an order of filiation is not as clearly a mark of 
illegitimacy as that afforded by any other legal determination. Other ques­
tions also tum on the ability to separate the determination of child support 
from that of filiation. For example, a court approved support agreement for 
an illegitimate child, while fully performed "bars other remedies of the 
mother or child for the support or education of the child."64 Does that 
mean that the mother, having entered an agreement with a person who has 
not admitted paternity but who has agreed to child support, cannot sue for 
an order of filiation? Because support and paternity are two different ques­
tions, the answer appears to be no; she may still sue to have paternity deter­
mined.OII Of course her suit must be timely; the agreement does not extend 
the time allowed.66 
Paternity is another area in which bizarre cases are no novelty.67 This 
year added another one to the list. In Commissioner of Welfare v. Wendt­
land,68 the respondent was held to be the father of a child on the basis of a 
single act of sexual intercourse with the mother. The order of filiation was 
issued, despite the fact that respondent testified at trial that he had had a 
vasectomy and despite the introduction of testimony by two physicians that 
they concluded he was sterile on the basis of the absence of spermatozoa in 
his semen. A third physician had refused to testify to sterility without a 
surgical examination. After an adverse finding, respondent submitted to the 
third doctor's surgery and was able to obtain an affidavit from him after the 
operation which stated with reasonable certainty that the respondent was 
sterile at the time of conception. On that basis, respondent moved in the 
family court to reopen the proceedings and to vacate the order of filiation. 
Family court denied the motion on the grounds that respondent had already 
had a trial. The appellate division reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
The law delights in absolutes. Things are possible or impossible. '''ithin 
the range of likely and next to impossible, the matter is not one of law but 
of fact and is decided by a jury. Probabilities may help jurors but they do 
not, as a general matter, make rules of law. ''\Then dealing with things as 
difficult to demonstrate as the responsibility for conception, that may be 
too bad. For example, if 93.6 per cent of full term babies have a period of 
gestation running a mean period of 282 days and falling within a range 
64. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 516(c). 
65. ABC v. XYZ, 50 Misc. 2d 792, 271 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966) (dictum). 
66. Ibid. 
67. See, e.g., Commissioner of Welfare v. Simon, 20 App. Div. 2d 865, 248 N.Y.S.2d 
611 (1st Dep't 1964). See also AIe.xander, Family Law, 1964 Survey of N.Y. Law, supra note 
57, at 412·13. 
68. 25 App. Div. 2d 640, 268 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam). 
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of 263 and 299 days, should that not affect a disputed paternity issue in 
which the mother urges the court to accept her story premised on a full term 
of 236 days? The first department thought that such evidence is not con­
clusive of nonpaternity. Affirming the trier of fact's resolution of the factual 
dispute, the appellate court, by a three to two decision, found the re­
spondent to be the father.69 
In any event, it would appear that one cannot bring a paternity pro­
ceeding in New York against an itinerant putative father. '\V'hatever may be 
said of the act leading to pregnancy, it is not the kind of tortious act to 
which New York's long-arm statute70 applies. Therefore, in personam juris­
diction of a putative father, who has left the state, will not be available, 
under the long-arm statute in a New York paternity proceeding.71 
MISCELLANEA 
In Anonymous v. Weiner,72 an action under Article 78 of the New York 
Civil Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter referred to as CPLR], was brought 
by a transsexual who, as a result of conversive surgery, has become outwardly 
female though remaining genetically male. Petitioner sought an order 
directing the New York City Department of Health to change the sex indi­
cated on petitioner's birth certificate from male to female to accord with 
petitioner's assumed role. 
Since the decision involved in this case had apparently been a difficult 
one for the Department of Health, the Department had sought guidance 
from the Board of Health which in tum had requested assistance from the 
New York Academy of Medicine to study the problems involved. The 
academy convened a group of specialists including gynecologists, endocrinol­
ogists, cytogenetics, psychiatrists and a lawyer. After deliberation, and 
despite information that ten states had permitted birth certificate changes 
of this sort by legislative action, the committee recommended that changes 
in birth certificates for transsexuals not be permitted. The Board of Health 
adopted the committee's resolution and the Department of Health applied 
it to petitioner. 
Seeing the issue before it as limited to an examination of respondent's 
act to determine if it was arbitrary, capricious or otherwise illegal, the court 
felt bound to affirm its determination. It would, presumably, be difficult to 
label a decision so carefully made on such eminent advice as either arbitrary 
or capricious. One may ask, however, what interest is being protected? Surely 
it is not the transsexual's. As the court notes,73 transsexuals have been 
69. Kiamos v. Chiladakis, 25 App. Div. 2d 647, 268 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1966) 
(mem.). 
70. N.Y. CPLR § 302. 
71. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49 Misc. 2d 675, 268 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Family Ct., Queen� 
Co. 1966). 
72. 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966). 
73. Id. at 382, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 321. 
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descdbed by an eminent authodty as among the most miserable people he has 
met. 'Vhat is the state's interest? 'What is the interest of a prospective em­
ployer? 'Vhatever the answer to these questions, are these interests suffi­
ciently weighty to explain the decision in this petitioner's case? 
FAMILY ECONOMICS 
Support.-The standard of support imposed on the husband living 
separately from his wife is left in large part to the discretion of the trial 
court. Judge l\'Ieyer has helpfully explored the exercise of that discretion.74 
Few of tlle hard and fast former rules governing the grant or denial of 
alimony have been retained in the present relevant section, New York 
Domestic Relations Law Section 236. For example, in Baker v. Baker,75 the 
court ruled that absent extraordinary circumstances temporary alimony 
could not be awarded during a pedod in which the spouses shared the same 
residence. The statute, probably with an eye to changing the result in 
Baker, provides that an order awarding temporary alimony "may be 
made notwithstanding that the parties continued to reside in the same 
abode . . .  :'76 This year the Appellate Division, First Department, which 
had refused to award temporary alimony without physical separation despite 
the contrary decisions, Schultz v. Schultz77 and Lowenfish v. Lowenfish,78 
in other departments, had an opportunity to deal with the question again 
under the present law. Apparently it remained unconvinced. Denying tem­
porary alimony, the court in a per curiam decision wrote: 
The elIect of the statute is certainly that a complaint is no longer dismissable under 
the rule in the Baker case; but the elIect is not to overrule al the factors men­
tioned in the Baker case as influential in determining the court's discretion. As 
was said in that case, it is not every discord or even substantial wrong committed 
by a spouse which inevitably results in judicial intervention in the marriage re­
lationship. Whether or not the parties continue living together, particularly where 
the wife has substantial resources of her own, is a significant datum in determining 
if the material discord has become so intolerable as to warrant or necessitate such 
intervention. Moreover, Domestic Relations Law, § 236, rather than denying, ex­
pressly provides for the e.xercise of the discretionary power of the court.79 
It would appear that the first department is still prepared to exercise its 
discretion in favor of its predeliction in Baker v. Baker.so To those who 
agree with the stated goal of the appellate division, to avoid judicial inter­
yention until mmital discord becomes intolerable and, presumably, to leave 
to the parties the effecting of relationships before that time, the opinion may 
seem desirable. Others wil no doubt feel that the court is merely providing 
74. Meyer, Judicial Discretion and Matrimonial Actions, 38 N.Y.S.B.J. 119 (1966). 
75. 16 App. Div. 2d 409, 288 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1st Dep't 1962). 
76. N.Y. Dom. Rei. Law § 236. 
77. 1 App. Div. 2d 930, 150 N.Y.S.2d 568 (4th Dep't 1956). 
78. 278 App. Diy. 716, 103 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1951). 
79. �oss v. Ross, 24 App. Div. 2d 125, 126·27, 264 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (1st Dep't 1965) 
(per cunam). 
80. Supra note 75. 
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one more impediment in the way of possible reconciliation by requiring the 
parties as a condition to obtaining judicial relief to live apart and thus 
perhaps reduce the possibility of resolving their conflicts. 
Another of the rules swept away by Section 236 of the Domestic Rela­
tions Law was the one which required that the wife be a successful litigant 
in one of the matrimonial actions in order to be entitled to support. Under 
the new law she may be entitled to alimony despite the fact she fails to win 
in her matrimonial action. Thus the supreme court could grant alimony 
where the parties lived apart by agreement, or as a result of a dispute not 
grave enough to provide either party with grounds for separation. 
Section 236 would appear to prohibit a wife's recovery of alimony only 
in the event that her improper behavior would allow a successful action to 
be brought against her. Even prior to section 236 i t  was clear that a wife 
could live separately from her husband where she had grounds for a decree 
of separation, and that as an incident to that decree, alimony would be 
awarded.s1 
Absent the wife's fault, a husband who fail s adequately to provide her 
with support, though they live apart, i s  guilty of nonsupport and subject 
to an award of alimony against him.S2 The first department had an oppor­
tunity to consider such a case in Brownstein v. Brownstein.83 Though deny­
ing a divorce to the wife, the court awarded alimony at trial. On review the 
appellate division modified and affirmed. After a review of the basic pro­
visions of section 236, demonstrating the extent of discretion allowed courts 
in fixing alimony, the court concluded: 
The accepted marital relations contemplates the proper and continued cohabita­
tion of the parties as husband and wife. Such cohabitation is vital to proper 
family life which is the backbone of our society. When parties marry, the state 
has an abiding interest in the preservation of a normal family relationship be­
tween them and with their offspring. The separation of spouses is not to be 
encouraged by an award of separate maintenance to the wife where, voluntarily 
and without justification she maintains a separate home. Public policy required 
that the discretion of the court to award separate maintenance to a wife be exer­
cised in light of these considerations.84 
Even so, the appellate division found the 3,500 dollars annual alimony 
award not excessive and "properly supported" although it reduced several 
items that the trial court had ordered reimbursed. 
A more difficult question was rai sed in Steinberg v. Stein berg.8s While 
the judges of the second department had no doubt of the obligation of a 
81. People ex reI. Comm'r of Pub. Charities &: Correction v. Cullen, 153 N.Y. 629, 
47 N.E. 894 (1897). 
82. St. Germain v. St. Germain, 23 App. Div. 2d 763, 258 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2d Dep't 
1965), aft'd, 16 N.Y.2d 764, 209 N.E.2d 813, 262 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1965) (mem.). It should be 
noted that the Court of Appeals while affirming without opinion did note a ca\cat. "We 
do not reach the interpretation or applicability of section 236 of the Domestic Relation� 
Law." Id. at 765, 209 N.E.2d at 814, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 492. 
83. 25 App. Div. 2d 205, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1I5 (1st Dep't 1966). 
84. Id. at 209, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 121. 
85. 25 App. Div. 2d 432, 265 N.Y.S.2d lOl l (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.). 
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husband to support his separately residing wife, they were less unanimous 
in deciding whether a family court acting under Section 412 of the Family 
Court Act had been relieved by Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law 
of the strictures of older law prohibiting support to a separately living wife 
unable to succeed in a matrimonial action. A majority of the court held 
that the family court had such authority and affirmed the decree. Two of the 
five justices dissented, noting that section 236 specifically refers to annul­
ments, declarations of nullity, separation and divorces, none of which 
properly lie in the family court. 
The same broad discretionary power which is accorded the court in 
initially setting alimony is applicable in redetermination of the level of 
alimony as well. Thus in Covert v. Covel't,S6 the court reduced the alimony 
award of a divorce decree from one hundred dollars to forty dollars a week 
primarily because of the additional expense that the husband faced as a 
result of his remarriage and the birth of three children. Such a result 
illustrates the change made by the granting of broad discretion. Under 
prior law, the additional expenses caused by the husband's remarriage 
could not be asserted as a change of circumstances sufficient to reduce 
alimony.87 
Whatever the authors of the lament that "it is always the woman who 
pays" had in mind, their statement has certainly not been true of post 
marital support in this state. So entrenched is the thought that the ex­
husband is the only party ever obligated to make payments that the statu­
tory sections dealing 'with post-marital finances occasionally slip into the 
elTor of identifying the recipient of payments as "wife." One such section 
is Domestic Relations Law Section 233 which relates to sequestration against 
out of state parties. 'Vhile the section does not expressly state that husbands 
may not benefit by its application, and does expressly provide the remedy 
for child support, the repeated mentioning of wives and the total absence 
of any reference to husbands appears to limit the use of the section to the 
distaff side. Nonetheless, the third department sequestered a wife's interest 
in a tenancy by the entirety for the benefit of her children residing with 
the husband.s8 If the statute was unclear, the court suggested, that matter 
should be called to the attention of the legislature. It seems strange that at 
so late a time there would be doubt about the obligation of women, as well 
as men, to help pay the enormous cost of marital reorganization. 
In the usual case of course, it is the husband who pays. In cases where 
the wife is in doubt as to his financial condition, discovery appears to be an 
increasingly viable device.89 
86. 48 Mise. 2d 386, 264 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct., Rockland Co. 1965). 
87. Levy v. Levy, 149 App. Div. 561, 133 N.Y.S. 1084 (1st Dep't 1912). 
88. Haslett v. Haslett, 25 App. Div. 2d 526, 268 N.Y.S.2d 809 (3rd Dep't 1966). 
89. See Kasden v. Kasden, 49 Misc. 2d 743, 268 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 
1966). 
HeinOnline -- 18 Syracuse L. Rev. 398 1966-1967
398 SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW 
Broad discretion has always marked the award of alimony for the sup ­
port of children. Thus, the improved financial condition of the husband 
may be a sufficient basis for an upward revision of alimony payments for 
child support, even though the children's need has not changed.9o 
The support of a former wife ceases on her remarriage.91 What if that 
marriage is void? Conceptually one might argue that a declaration of nullity 
for the remarriage would lead to a revival of the obligation which ter­
minated because of the second marriage.92 Such literalism is unwarranted, 
however, since it  is quite clear that, whatever its theory, annulment does not 
destroy all vestiges of the intervening marriage. For example, the "marriage" 
is sufficient consideration for a gift in contemplation of marriage, sufficient 
to make remarriage of one of the parties during its continuance bigamy. 
and sufficient by statute to legitimate any children born of the union, 
according to the court in Gaines v. Jacobsen.93 Furthermore, the declaration 
of nullity does not bar charging the "husband" of the second marriage with 
the duty to support his "wife." Thus, in terms of the obligation to support 
the woman in question, an annulment can be treated similarly to a divorce 
since the financial obligations are merely shifted to the latest marital 
partner.94 
The New York Court of Appeals in Gaines accordingly overruled the 
prior case of Sleicher v. Sleicher,95 and relegated the wife to support by her 
second marital partner. This year, a more difficult question arose. 'Vould 
the Gaines rule be applied if the wife, because of the applicability of foreign 
law, was not entitled to support from the person with whom she entered 
into the void second marriage? In Denberg v. Frischman,06 the court ruled 
that it made no difference. Even though the wife may consequently find 
herself without support from either of the men she married, the first hus­
band was relieved of his obligation of support. 
If one purpose of the termination of support obligations on remarriage is 
to allow the hubsand of the prior marriage the opportunity of remaking 
his life financially, and of possibly" establishing a new family, the Denberg 
results would appear to facilitate reaching these goals. 
[I]f the Gaines rule were not applicable, many years may pass. First husband may 
have remarried, as did the one in the Gaines case, and as did the plaintiff husband 
in this case. New families may have been established on the basis of the seeming 
duty to support but one family. Innocents, in the way of subsequent wives of such 
90. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 48 Misc. 2d 859, 265 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 
1965). 
91. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 248. 
92. Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929). 
93. 308 N.Y. 218, 225, 124 N.E.2d 290, 294 (1954). 
94. But see Newburger y. Newburger, 228 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1961), 
aff'd, 17 App. Diy. 2d 323, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1962), discussed in Alexander, Family Law, 
1962 Survey of New York Law, supra note 42, at 339 n.49 and accompanying text (suggest­
ing a different alimony standard for annulment cases). 
95. Supra note 92. 
96. 24 App. Diy. 2d 100, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1st Dep't 1965). 
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husbands, and the children of such unions, may suffer, because the first wives may 
ha\e made foolish errors in their remarriages. At the same time, plain language 
with the plainest of manifested intentions would be distorted to effect an assumed 
substantial justice based on subsequent events not necessarily within the control 
or contemplation of the immediate parties to the agreement. Chaos and trouble 
enough already exist in this troubled field without adding new chaos and new 
trouble.97 
399 
Contemplation of Divorce.-It w as predic table that Viles v. Viles,9s 
w ith its hold ing th at an agreemen t  to ob tain a d ivorc e inv alid ated a s ep ar a­
tion agreem en t between th e par ties, al though the sep aration agreemen t 
m ade  no expr ess men tion of it, would l ead to ex tens iv e  l itig ation. I t  h as. 
Since the d ecision app ears b asic ally unsound,99 it is for tun ate th at th e cour ts 
h av e, on the whole, found ways of avoiding its holding.10o 
The new divorc e l aw app ears to pu t the Viles probl em to res t.101 S ec tion 
5-31 1  of the N ew York Gen er al Obligations Law as amended reads as 
follows : 
An agreement, heretofore or hereafter made bet1'l'een a husband and wife, shall 
not be considered a contract to alter or dissolve the marriage unless it contains 
an express provision requiring the dissolution of marriage or provides for the 
procurement of grounds for divorce. 
So urg en t  was th e need for this r evision af ter Viles th at it, with on e exc ep­
tion, was the only sec tion of th e bill to becom e l aw on p ass ag e, r ather th an 
on Sep temb er 1, 1967. 
Drafting Agreemen ts.-This year again demons tr ated th e impor tanc e 
to th e par ties of thinking through the conditions wh ich w ill c aus e the 
termin ation of paym ents under separation agreem en ts , befor e such agree­
ments ar e sign ed. If a husb and feels th at h is wif e's adul tery ough t to 
terminate his obligation to suppor t her, he should no t s ign a sep aration 
3&'reemen t that fails so to provid e. O thenvis e his con trac t  w ill b e  enforce­
abl e  ilTesp ec tive of his wife's conduc t.102 If a separation agreemen t  ter-
�7. Id. at 1O t, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 1 l 8. 
98. 36 Misc. 2d 731, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1 1 2  (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 19(2), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 
2d 626, 245 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1st Dep't 19(3), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 365, 200 N.E.2d 567, 251 N.Y.S.2d 
672 (1964). 
�j9. Sec Alexander, Family Law, 1963 Survey of New York Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 
369, 373 n.32 and accompan)ing text. 
100. Friedman v. Friedman, 25 App. Div. 2d 468, 265 N.Y.S.2d 991 (3d Dep't 1966) 
(incorporation in foreign decree makes separation agreement immune from collateral 
attack); Fitzgerald v. Morgenstern, 48 Misc. 2d 575, 265 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 
19G!i); Laye v. Shepard, 48 Misc. 2d 478, 265 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965), aff'd, 
25 App. Div. 2d 498, 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Dep't 19(6) (husband's remarriage estops his 
conte,ting legality of separation agreement); McLean v. Friar, 47 Misc. 2d 422, 262 
N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965) (appearance by husband bars his contesting validating 
of separation agreement when agreement incorporated in decree); -Werber v. 'Verber, 47 
Mhc. 2d 399, 262 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965) (incorporation of separation agreement 
into Mexican decree estops challenge by appearing party). But see Gunter v. Gunter, 47 
Misc. 2d 861, 263 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965) (staying arbitration of a separation 
agreement which had been incorporated in a Mexican decree because the validity of the 
�eparation agreement could not summarily be determind on affidavits). 
101. N.Y. Gen. Ob. Law § 5·311 (MCKinney Supp. 1966). 
102. DiCicco v. DiCicco, 50 Mise. 2d 347, 270 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1966). 
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minates child support payments only on majority, then a son's enlistment or 
induction into the military service does not terminate the husband's obliga­
tion to pay his wife the agreed-on sum even though the son resides with the 
armed forces.103 
Another note of caution with respect to drafting separation agreements 
is contained in the afance of Rosenblatt v. Birnbaum.lo4 While the court 
held the former wife and her present husband accountable for child sup­
port payments made by the former husband, on the contractual basis of 
accord and satisfaction, it refused to rule on the question of whether a wife 
who diverts payments made under a separation agreement for child support 
is accountable in equity as a trustee for the moneys paid to her.lOS As pre­
viously noted, lOG it would seem wise to make a former wife an express 
trustee of child support payments made under a separation agreement. 
The open question of the wife's status, with respect to payments she 
receives under child support provisions of a separation agreement, was 
answered by a court in Westchester County. In Landau v. Ostrowe,107 the 
court held that the wife was not a trustee, basing its logic on the dissenting 
opinion in Rosenblatt, and adding some practical considerations of its own: 
A rule which would impose the duties of a trustee upon a wife under these cir­
cumstances seems to ignore the realities of family day-to-day living. It would 
mean that a wife, who has just experienced the trauma of a broken marriage, 
and who is suddenly faced with the responsibility and duty of bringing up the 
children of the marriage alone, must keep detailed records of every expenditure, 
must keep the funds she receives from her husband separate from any other 
funds, and must be prepared, upon the attainment by the children of their major­
ity, to institute final judicial settlement proceedings or to obtain her discharge 
by recording instruments. Presumably, she would be entitled to commissions at 
the expense of her own children. The remedy proposed for the evil of the occa­
sionally dishonest mother is too drastic.lOS 
Of course, creating a trust to support children only resolves the ques­
tion of the disposition of the money. The amount to be paid under changing 
circumstances may still lead to disputes which, absent an agreement provid­
ing for them, may lead to cantankerous litigation. An important decision 
this year, Schneider v. Schneider,lo9 suggests an alternative to litigation­
arbitration. The case is a useful companion to Sheets v. Sheets,no which, in 
dictum, suggested that arbitration might appropriately be provided for 
child custody questions. Schneider was decided despite the provisions of 
CPLR Section 1209, which prohibit the arbitration of a controversy in­
volving an infant or judicially declared incompetent without prior court 
103. Craig v. Craig, 24 App. Div. 2d 588, 262 N.Y.S.2d 398 (2d Dep't 1965). 
104. 16 N.Y.2d 212, 212 N.E.2d 37, 264 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1965). 
105. For a discussion of the Rosenblatt case see Alexander, Family Law, 1964 Survey 
of New York Law, 1 6  Syracuse L. Rev. 402, 411 n.63 and accompanying text. 
106. Ibid. 
107. 50 Misc. 2d 474, 270 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1966). 
108. Id. at 477, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 726. 
109. 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1966). 
1 1 0. 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1964). 
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approval. The decision can be justified on the fonnal basis relied on by the 
court: Children are not contracting parties in separation agreements and, 
therefore, are not involved in the controversy. It also appears to make good 
�ense to provide the parties the easier route of arbitration in the resolution 
of what may well be a continuing problem. 
Although children are not contracting parties to separation agreements, 
the Court of Appeals ruled that they might enforce provisions of such agree­
ments as third party beneficiaries despite defenses available against a 
custodial mother.l11 
,Measuring Alimon)'.-A curious feature of the law relating to alimony 
is i ts stark deviation from the nonn in detennining damages. We insist that 
a personal injury judgment must be reduced to a single figure large enough 
to take care of future expenses, and do this in the face of the recognition of 
the trier's inability to know such things as the actual life span of the 
victim, his future medical progress, his future employability, his future 
consequential personality changes and a whole host of other variables.112 
'When it comes to the future support of a divorced wife, however, just the 
opposite is true. Courts insist on making judgments on the basis of existing 
facts, and holding the husband to periodic payments which are almost 
always subject to alteration in the event that variables make the amount 
either excessive or inadequate. One result of such policy is to open the 
courts to post-marital litigation 'without any determinable finite end. The 
parties, whose animosities toward each other led to their separation, are 
given an opportunity to vent their spleen as the occasion suggests itself by 
hauling their fonner spouse back into court. The result is especially curious 
when the parties have contractually agreed to avoid such future combat. 
Parties are still free, apparently, to detennine the level of future support by 
a separation agreement, and, if the level does not threaten to make a public 
charge out of the wife at some future time, it is generally held that the 
existence of the agreement will prevent further litigation as to the alimony 
required for the spouse's support.l13 In the event that the wife is in danger 
of becoming a public charge, the Court of Appeals made clear last year that 
a separation agreement would not bar future support litigation.l14 In re­
taining the right to re-examine the level of support, should the 'wife become 
a public charge, courts have found their authority to protect the public 
interest sufficient reason to seek support for the wife from other than public 
funds. 'Whatever one's views on the appropriateness of such indemnification, 
the policy is one mandated by the law of the state.l15 
l I i .  Fonnan v. Fonnan, 17 N.Y.2d 274, 217 N.E.2d 645, 270 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1966). 
l I 2. See generally Gregory 8: Kalven, Torts, 429·41 (1959). 
1 13. Galusha v. Galusha, 1 1 6  N.Y. 635, 22 N.E. 1 1 14 (1889). 
1 14. McMains v. McMains, 1 5  N.Y.2d 283, 206 N.E.2d 185, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1965). 
For further discussion see Alexander, Family Law, 1965 Survey of New York Law, 1 7  
Syracuse L. Rev. 318, 328. 
l iS. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 415; N.Y. Gen. Ob. Law § 5·3 1 1 ;  N.Y. Soc. WeI. Law § 101. 
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What policy is served by refusing to honor a commitment between the 
parties barring future relitigation when the wife is in no danger of becom­
ing a public charge? In Spector v. Spector,11s the parties had previously 
agreed to a lump sum alimony settlement. The husband was to pay over 
100,000 dollars in alimony and attorney's fees, in return for which the wife 
agreed not to make any future application for alimony or counsel fees. 
The agreement was made after a trial court had granted an annulment 
and awarded 3,600 dollars a year alimony. After the agreement was signed, 
the trial justice ruled that it was fair and equitable, modified the ali­
mony decree by striking the provision for annual alimony, and by order 
barred the wife from making any application to any court for further 
support payments. None of these facts dissuaded the Onondaga County 
Supreme Court, on the wife's petition, from ordering the husband to pro­
vide future support when much of the money had run out. The court 
apparently realized that it was establishing a right on the wife's part to con­
tinuous periodic support, even though not necessary to keep her from wel­
fare rolls, since it said: .. 'Justice' would not be satisfied by keeping a wife 
at mere subsistence and denying relief just because she had not yet become 
a public charge." 1l7 It is submitted that once the court is satisfied that both 
parties to a post-marital financial settlement have fairly treated each other, 
and that the state's interest in avoiding the support of the wife through wel­
fare payments has been satisfied, there is no legitimate interest to be pro­
tected which is strong enough to account for this manner of intervention in 
the private agreement of the parties. 
Two cases illustrated serious difficulties with respect to obtaining an 
order for counsel fees. In Dannheim v. Babbitt118 attorney's fees were denied 
to a mother seeking support under the Uniform Support of Dependents 
Law.n9 The rationale suggested was not only the dearth of express authority 
for counsel fees in such cases, but the express provision of Section 39 of 
the Domestic Relations Law affording plaintiffs the gratuitous assistance of 
public counsel and requiring public counsel to undertake representation. 
In McKenna v. AfcKenna120 attorney's fees were denied, under Domestic 
Relations Law Section 237, to an attorney for services rendered in negotiat­
ing a separation agreement. The decision apparently turned on a strict 
reading of section 237(a). The court recognized the possibility of an alterna­
tive interpretation broad enough to allow attorney's fees in the case, but 
chose to be guided by cases decided under the prior law. The McKenna 
result appears especially unfortunate because it is quite clear that the 
1 16. 49 Misc. 2d 591, 267 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1965), alI'd, 24 App. 
Div. 2d 1082, 265 N.Y.S.2d 632 (4th Dep't 1965). 
1 17. Id. at 594, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 962. 
1 18. 48 Misc. 2d 310, 264 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Family Ct., Allegheny Co. 1965). 
119. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law art. 3-A. 
120. 49 Misc. 2d 563, 267 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1966). 
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attorney fees in this case would have been included in the decree had the 
attorney spent the same amount of time preparing the issue of alimony for 
litigation. If there is merit to the policy allowing parties privately to settle 
their financial affairs and barring relitigation of such settlements, decisions 
such as McKenna would appear to thwart the policy. 
Enforcing Support Obligations.-It is one thing to obtain an order for 
support against the husband. It is another thing to collect it. 'Wives and 
children are, in law, somewhat preferred creditors. Apparently they are not 
preferred enough to allow a contractual provision, that outstanding alimony 
installments shall be a general lien against the estate of the deceased 
husband, to give them priority over a statutory tax lien.l21 ,\,yhere the other 
contestant is a less preferred general creditor, however, the result may be 
different. The problem of payroll deductions presents an interesting ex­
ample. In Beahm v. Beahm,122 where four separate cases were joined, Judge 
Midonick dealt with a problem which he described as "typical of a welter 
of others daily being heard and heard again in the Family Court of the 
State of New York."123 ,\,yhat effect does a payroll deduction order made 
under Section 49-b of the Personal Property Law have on an income execu­
tion under CPLR Section 5231(e )? In a very articulate opinion, Judge 
Midonick concluded that a later payroll deduction for support of a wife 
or children may either be granted priority by making it the exclusive author­
ized deduction from wages, or may be given concurrent effect with extant 
income executions. Each case must apparently be decided on its own merits. 
Indeed, he decided two of the cases differently than the remaining two. 
While the reader may not find in the decision a blueprint for future cer­
tainty, since the Judge subscribes to Curtis' fondness for selective and adjust­
able inexactitude,124 he does identify the competing interests: 
The problem involved here is to analyze and, hopefully, to reconcile fairly, 
the complicated and conflicting interests of at least five quite separate elements of 
the community: 
1. The interests of the wife in her own support and in the support of her 
children. 
2. The interests of the husband in what remains of his earnings for his own 
living needs, and also for the support of his wife and children. 
3. The interest of judgment creditors in the collection of their debts despite 
the claims for support by the debtor'S family. 
4. The interest of society in the prevention of deprivation to children, the 
wife and the husband. 
5. The interest of society in minimizing the payment of public money to the 
Department of Welfare. In the great majority of cases which appear in this court 
showing conflicting problems of family support and judgment debt, the Depart­
ment of Welfare is supporting in whole or in part the deprived wife and chil­
dren.1:l5 
121.  Matter of Estate of Greene, 47 Mise. 2d 140, 261 N.Y.S.2d 977 (SUIT. Ct., N.Y. 
Co. 1965). 
122. 47 Misc. 2d 900, 263 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Family Ct., Kings Co. 1965). 
123. Id. at 900, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 534. 
124. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation in Jurisprudence in Action 
(1953). 
125. Beahm v. Beahm, supra note 122, at 905·06, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 538-39. 
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The Judge also spells out in detail his reasons for decision with respect to 
the four cases being considered.126 
Wives and their lawyers, like other creditors, can go beyond the st?ck 
remedies, and, by the use of ingenuity, on occasion find a new means of en­
forcing husbands' obligations. When she failed to receive the payments due 
her under a separation agreement, the wife in Federated Department Stores, 
Inc. v. Seizer121 charged her needs in the plaintiff's store. The store collected 
from the husband despite the fact that the husband had previously notified 
them that he would no longer be responsible for his wife's debts. The court 
made it clear that the husband was obligated to provide necessaries and 
that the shop keeper was fully justified in extending credit to the wife as a 
means of allowing her the necessities to which she was entitled. The court 
also made it clear that it was not discussing the basic needs of shelter and 
food when it spoke of necessaries, but was speaking instead of items reason­
ably required by the wife for the support of herself and her child. 
Not all theories are successful, however. In Karron v. Karron128 the wife 
sought to impress a constructive trust on her husband's business partners in 
an effort to keep them from what she alleged was systematic exploitation. 
According to the wife, her husband was either unable or unwilling to look 
after his interests; apparently she proposed to look after them for him in 
order to secure sufficient financial stability on his part to assure payments 
due her under a family court order. The court would not intervene. 
The success of Esther James in recovering from Representative Adam 
Clayton Powell an amount in addition to her prior judgment, for the 
additional expenses incurred by her in her attempt to collect the judgment, 
by use of a tortious conspiracy theory, is now well known,129 Less well 
known is the fact that three months before the James decision an angered 
wife successfully prosecuted such a theory in Wolf v. Wolf.l30 While the 
analogue suggested in the Wolf case appears extremely ina propos to the de­
cision in the case, both Wolf and Powell suggest that creditors may yet have 
another avenue of relief: the tort of unfairly avoiding creditors. 
The state's asserted interest in being reimbursed for welfare payments 
by close relatives still finds its expression in reported cases. Thus, where a 
recipient of welfare payments dies, it is the Commissioner of Welfare who 
first satisfies his claim, arising out of previous welfare payments, rather than 
the children of the decedent who also extended assistance and who were 
also owed a debt.1S1 Grandparents, however, are no longer subject to the 
126. Id. at 912-14, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45. 
127. 49 Mise. 2d 429, 267 N_Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965). 
128. 48 Misc. 2d 928, 266 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1965). 
129. James v. Powell, 25 App. Div. 2d I, 266 N.Y.S.2d (1st  1966). 
130. 47 Mise. 2d 756, 263 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.  
131.  Matter of Estate of Errico, 49 Misc. 2d 1055, 269 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Surr. Ct .• N.Y. 
Co. 1966). 
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mandate to indemnify the state for welfare payments made to their grand­
children. The legislature removed their obligation by amending Section 415 
of the Family Court Act and Section 101(1) of the Social Welfare Law to 
exclude their liability. Apparently overlooked was Section 32(7) of the 
Domestic Relations Law, which also provided for grandparental liability. 
Faced with an assertion that grandparents still had an obligation to support 
under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, the family court in Lenti 
v. Lenti,132 found a public policy statement in the two previous amendments 
and incorporated it into the Uniform Support of Dependents Law. The 
legislature has since corrected its error. Chapter 131 of the Laws of 1966 
removes grandparental responsibility from the Uniform Support of De­
pendents Law. The obligation to keep one's blood line from public welfare 
now runs only two generations. 
132. 48 Misc. 2d 206, 264 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Family Ct., Dutchess Co. 1965). 
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